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Multiple Disadvantage and Wage Growth: The Effect of Merit-pay on Pay Gaps 
This article concerns rates of wage growth amongst women and minority groups, and their impact on pay gaps. Specifically, it focuses on the pay 
progression of people with more than one disadvantaged identity, and on the impact of merit-pay. Recent research indicates that pay gaps for people in 
more than one disadvantaged category are wider than those with a single disadvantage. It is not known whether these gaps are closing, at what rate, and 
whether all groups are affected equally; nor is it known whether merit-pay alleviates or exacerbates existing pay gaps. In addressing these issues, the 
analysis draws on longitudinal payroll data from a large UK-based organisation. Results show that pay gaps are closing, however the rate of convergence is 
slow relative to the size of existing pay disparities, and slowest of all for people with disabilities. When the effect of merit-pay is isolated it is found to have 
a small positive effect in reducing pay gaps, and this effect is generally larger for dual/multiple disadvantaged groups. These findings run counter to the 




This article is concerned with the impact of pay progression in organisations on wage growth amongst disadvantaged groups in the labour 
market (specifically women, ethnic minorities, and people with disabilities). We focus specifically on the impact on those with more than one 
such disadvantage, and give particular attention to the role of merit-pay in wage growth inequalities. It is well known that in western societies 
people in disadvantaged groups experience, on average, a pay gap in relation to their more privileged counterparts (Longhi and Platt, 2008; 
Green and Ferber, 2005). Recent evidence from the UK (Woodhams et al, 2013) indicates that multiple disadvantage is associated with lower 
pay: people with more than one disadvantage are paid less on average than those with a single disadvantage, and the more labour market 
disadvantages someone carries the lower (on average) is their pay. Whilst there is evidence that the gender wage gap in the UK and elsewhere is 
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declining (ONS, 2011; Blau and Khan, 2006; Green and Ferber, 2005; O’Neill, 2003) – though it remains substantial – less is known about the 
relative wage growth experienced by other disadvantaged groups (Brynin and Güveli, 2012; Malo and Pagán, 2012) and less still in relation to 
those with multiple disadvantages.  
Here we focus on pay progression as a contributor to wage growth and the narrowing or otherwise of pay gaps. Pay progression within 
organisations may arise from promotions, annual incremental rises, cost of living awards and merit-pay awards. We have a specific interest in 
the latter. Merit-pay schemes, though increasingly popular (Salimäki and Jämsén, 2009), have been criticised in relation to their impact on 
payment equality on the grounds that their subjectivity gives expression to pre-existing prejudices (Elvira and Graham, 2002; Castilla and 
Bernard, 2010), or that the way that merit is conceived serves to exclude disadvantaged groups from access to it (Kumra, 2010), legitimising and 
reinforcing existing hierarchies (Son Hing et al., 2011). These arguments would suggest that merit awards would be lower for disadvantaged 
groups, thus contributing to relatively lower wage growth and, ceteris paribus, a widening of pay gaps. The thrust of earlier research on multiple 
disadvantage and pay (Woodhams et al, 2013) might also lead one to expect that those with dual or multiple disadvantages would fare worse in 
this respect. While that research drew on cross-sectional pay data, here we can draw on longitudinal data from a large private sector organisation 
in the UK that operates a merit-pay scheme to show whether pay progression is reinforcing (or indeed alleviating) the link between multiple 
disadvantage and lower pay. We start by reviewing what is known about pay gaps, wage growth and the impact of merit-pay schemes on 
employment equality. 
Multiple Disadvantage, Pay Gaps and Wage Growth 
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Pay gaps relating to equality strands in the UK – and elsewhere – are well-documented when groups are contrasted on a single axis of 
“difference”. The median hourly pay gap between men and women in the UK stands at 19.5% (ONS, 2011). This gap is smaller for women 
working full-time (9.1%, ONS, 2011) but much higher (34.5%, Perfect, 2011) for women working part-time. Most UK ethnic minority groups 
suffer a pay gap in relation to the “White British” category (Brynin and Guveli, 2012), as high as 22.9% for men of Pakistani origin (Metcalf, 
2009), though there are substantial differences in the experiences of different ethnic groups (Elliott and Lindley, 2008). Disabled workers are, on 
average, paid less than non-disabled workers (Metcalf, 2009; Longhi and Platt, 2008), with gaps of between 6% and 26% reported, though this is 
sensitive to the severity of impairment (Malo and Pagán, 2012). Both older and younger workers suffer pay gaps in relation to employees in 
‘mid-career’. Average hourly pay in the UK peaks in the 40-49 age range, with workers aged 22–29 years and those aged over 60 experiencing 
pay gaps of over 20% in relation to this group (Metcalf, 2009).  
Rather less is known about the pay deficits experienced by people in more than one disadvantaged category, i.e. those who are in dual, triple or 
even quadruple axis categories (Browne and Misra, 2003). Recent research on multiple disadvantage and pay (Woodhams et al, 2013) indicates 
that the more labour market disadvantages (i.e. in relation to gender, ethnicity, disability and age) an employee has, the lower their pay is on 
average – in this study the gap in median earnings was over £8000 ($13,000) per year between the most advantaged and disadvantaged groups. 
These authors found that the effect of accumulation of disadvantages on pay was in some cases greater than would arise from simply adding the 
pay penalties arising from single disadvantages, and this effect tended to be more marked amongst multiple disadvantaged groups.  
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There is evidence that gender pay gaps have narrowed over the long term in the UK and other western economies. For example, between 1970 
and 2006 (in the US) there was a 44% growth in women’s pay compared with 6% for men (Butler, 2010). However, in relation to gender, the 
pace of change has been uneven and wage growth has not benefited all female workers to the same extent (Grimshaw et al., 2001; Blau and 
Khan, 2006; Mason, 2011). Very little evidence is available as to the change in pay gaps affecting people with dual or multiple disadvantaged 
identities. There is some evidence around gender and ethnicity in the US: for example, Anderson and Shapiro report that black women’s pay rose 
from 50% of the white average in 1940 to parity in 1980 before slipping back to 91% in the late 1980s. However, there is sparse evidence of 
changing (or otherwise) pay gaps affecting people with other pairs of disadvantages, and we know of no research that examines this in relation to 
people with multiple disadvantages. 
There are a number of factors underlying the differential wage-growth that contributes to the narrowing of pay gaps. Social changes may impact 
on wage levels, for example, increasing female participation in the labour market, improving conditions for second and third generation 
immigrants, reductions in occupational segregation resulting from reduced stereotyping and improved role-models (Brynin and Guveli, 2012; 
Elliott and Lindley, 2008; Grimshaw et al., 2001). Institutional changes also have an effect, by impacting on employers or in shaping the social 
trends noted above (Elliott and Lindley, 2008; Malo and Pagán, 2012; Grimshaw et al., 2001). For example, anti-discrimination legislation may 
be a factor in reducing occupational segregation, both horizontal – arising from hiring decisions – and vertical – arising from promotion 
decisions. Equal pay legislation is likely to have had a role in reducing the scope for overt pay discrimination (Anderson and Shapiro, 1996). 
Minimum wage regimes may also disproportionally benefit disadvantaged workers in low paid occupations, and thus contribute to a closure of 
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wage gaps (Gunderson, 1975; Orrenius and Zavodny, 2008). However, our interest here is on the impact of employer practices, particularly 
payment systems, in maintaining, reducing or widening pay gaps, and it is to this that we now turn. 
Payment Systems and Wage Growth 
Pay gaps in organisations may result from differences in entry-level pay or from different rates of pay progression once in employment (Brynin 
and Güveli, 2012). Differences in entry-level pay have been repeatedly found. For example, in the US, people from ethnic minorities are 
reported to be offered wages that are lower by 10 to 19% compared to their white counterparts (Neumark, 1999; Weinberger, 1998). However, in 
the context of equal pay legislation, differences in entry level pay for men and women are less likely to be due to direct discrimination by 
employers than was previously the case, and more likely to result from continuing occupational segregation and lower pay in feminised work 
(Eveline and Todd, 2009; Black and Spitz-Oener, 2010) – itself arising from institutional devaluing of women’s work (Sayers, 2012), gender 
differences in wage bargaining power, or women’s choices (Amaran, 2010; Hakim, 2011). Similar (though not directly equivalent) arguments 
are expounded in the debates around entry level wage gaps affecting ethnic minorities, disabled people and older/younger workers (Malo and 
Pagán, 2012; Weinberger, 1998; Shapiro and Sandell, 1985).  
Recently, attention has turned to the impact of systems of payment progression in organisations, and their role in differential wage growth and 
thus the maintenance or diminution of pay gaps. Increased attention paid by organisations to equality good practice has improved opportunities 
for development, promotion and pay rises. For the last 20 years in the UK, a move toward harmonisation, simplification and shorter pay bands 
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has considerably reduced the equal pay risk (Perkins and White, 2010). Systems of merit-pay have also attracted particular interest in this regard, 
not least as they have become increasingly common in western economies in recent years. More than 60% of UK organisations cited “individual 
performance” as the most common factor used to determine pay progression (CIPD, 2011) and increased use of such systems is reported 
elsewhere in Europe and in the USA (Salimäki and Jämsén, 2009; McGregor, 2008; Castilla, 2012; Elvira and Graham, 2002). This trend may be 
driven by an number of factors (Campbell et al., 1988; Phillips, 2008; Compensation and Benefits for Law Offices, 2007; Castilla and Benard, 
2010) – for example, a view that the use of incentives will increase motivation, drive up performance, and help attract and retain high performers 
– outcomes which are contested (McGregor, 2008; Salimäki and Jämsén, 2009– or that they will support strategies to individualise the 
employment relationship.  
Regardless of their general merits (or otherwise), there is a prima facie argument that performance pay systems would have a beneficial, or at 
least neutral, impact on pay gaps. In a truly meritocratic system, every individual would be judged on their achievements and efforts regardless 
of non-merit factors such as their gender or ethnicity (Castilla and Benard, 2010). All other things being equal, this should lead to even wage 
growth between groups and possibly faster growth amongst disadvantaged groups where this serves to correct the effects of previous prejudice. 
However, there are also reasons to be sceptical. Merit-schemes have been subject to an extensive critique in relation to equality issues, 
particularly gender equality.  
There is long-standing concern that such systems rely on judgments – performance ratings – that are inherently subjective (Elvira and Graham, 
2002). This subjectivity allows a space for political influences, favouritism and bias to come to the fore (Salimäki and Jämsén, 2009). Castilla 
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and Bernard (2010) show how merit-pay judgements act as triggers to existing cognitive biases, resulting in women and other disadvantaged 
groups begin given lower pay awards than men and other privileged groups. This is likely to be particularly prevalent where merit systems are 
not formalised (Fiske, 1998; Reskin, 2000; Elvira and Graham, 2002). A second concern is that people may differ in their attitudes towards and 
behavioural responses to competition (Manning and Saidi, 2010). Women in particular are thought to fare less well in situations where 
performance is linked to pay growth (Dohmen and Falk, 2011; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007), though not in all cases (Asplund and Napari, 
2011), or they may ‘opt out’ of jobs in which performance pay is the norm (Manning and Saidi, 2010).  
A third concern centres on the idea that the very notion of ‘merit’ that underpins performance pay systems is itself gendered (or subject to 
inherent bias in relation to other social categories). Under this analysis, merit is not an objective quality, but a social construction (Kumra, 2010) 
that allows employment decisions made on less transparent grounds to be legitimised. Merit is defined in the context of power relations 
(Thornton, 2007; Son Hing et al., 2011), by those with power, and in their image, thus excluding from ‘merit’ (by definition) those who differ. 
We note, for now, that this view is itself not without its critics (Farber and Sherry, 1995), but observe that, if true, one outcome would be that 
merit-pay systems, far from opening up fair competition to the advantage of previously disadvantaged groups, would simply institutionalise 
existing inequalities and wage gaps. This idea receives some empirical support from Castilla and Benard (2010), who showed that in 
organisations styled as ‘meritocratic’, managers were likely to give higher pay awards to men than to (equally performing) women.  
There are good reasons, then, to expect that merit pay systems, rather than contributing to faster wage growth amongst disadvantaged groups and 
thus a narrowing of pay gaps, might have the opposite effect. In other words, they might accelerate the wage growth of groups who already 
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receive higher average pay in relation to workers from disadvantaged groups. Our interest here is in how this might affect employees who have 
more than one employment disadvantage (in relation to age, gender, ethnicity, disability). In relation to pay levels, as opposed to pay growth, 
recent research (Woodhams et al, 2013) suggests that there may be an interaction effect that in some cases reduces average pay below what one 
would expect from simply adding up the pay deficits that people experience from being in a single disadvantaged category. Why this should be 
is not clear, and there are likely to be complex and multiple reasons.  
Part of the explanation may lie in the fact that organisational responses to inequality are designed to address the experiences of people with a 
single disadvantage, and may fail to adequately address the problems faced by those with multiple disadvantages. Organisation equality policy 
and practice is not structured to embrace cases of multiple disadvantage. It tends to follow, in line with the regulatory approach of the UK and, in 
the most part, the US, a single-axis means of diagnosing inequality (Hannett, 2003; Fredman, 2011) using categories comprising ‘sex’, ‘race’, 
‘religion’, ‘disability’, and so on. This tradition requires complainants and employees with a grievance to tackle each strand of discrimination, 
whether about pay or otherwise, separately, using, first, the single strand of redress which has the most likelihood of success and if necessary 
following it with others. However, this sequential approach may not address the full extent of discrimination (see Woodhams et al, 2013), 
leaving many opportunities that lead to pay growth, such as training and development and applications for promotion, more difficult for people 
with more than one disadvantaged identity to access. Organisations, no matter how keen they are to promote best practice in equality, may 
overlook the inequality that employees with multiple disadvantage face. Regarding pay and pay growth, for example, a well-meaning 
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organisation may conduct an Equal Pay Audit following step-by-step advice from the Equality and Human Rights Commission (2012), but 
therein the explicit focus is limited to those identified by a single axis of disadvantage. For example, organisations are encouraged to: 
 Compar[e] the pay of men/women; minority ethnic/white; disabled/non-disabled staff … doing equal work. 
 Clos[e] pay gaps that cannot satisfactorily be explained on grounds other than one of the protected grounds.  
The assumption within this mono-dimensional comparative approach is that, if no significant differences are found in the circumstances between 
one group and their binary pairing, there is no evidence for discrimination.  
We are now in a position to consider (and explore) some possibilities around wage growth amongst multiple disadvantaged groups, and the 
impact of merit-pay in particular. In respect of wage growth generally, we might expect to see the general trend of narrowing pay gaps for single 
categories being reflected in the position of multiple disadvantaged groups. However, given recent evidence that pay gaps for multiple 
disadvantaged groups are often larger than would be expected if one simply added the impact of their single disadvantages (Woodhams et al, 
2013), it is possible that the narrowing of pay gaps for these groups might happen at a slower pace. In other words, whatever factors are causing 
multiple disadvantaged groups to do worse may also slow their rate of ‘catch up’. In respect of wage growth that is due solely to merit-pay, there 
are grounds for expecting to find the same pattern. As people with multiple disadvantages are under-protected by law and organisational 
practice, they are likely to be particularly vulnerable to inequalities arising from merit pay schemes. There is plenty of evidence for such 
inequalities arising. Furthermore, if people with a single disadvantage suffer from merit-pay acting as a trigger of bias, and from the unequal 
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effects of the social construction of merit, there are reasons to expect that people with multiple disadvantage (vulnerable to more sources of bias, 
and with more barriers to achieving ‘merit’) would fare even worse. In short, there are good reasons to expect that the wage growth resulting 
from merit-pay would be lower for people with multiple disadvantages than for those with one or none; and that wage gaps arising from merit-
pay would, all things being equal, be widening rather than narrowing.  
Research Questions 
In exploring these possibilities, we pose two research questions: 
1. Are rates of wage growth lower for those with single and multiple disadvantaged identities than they are for other employees?  
2. Are the rates of wage growth due to merit-pay lower for those with single and multiple disadvantaged identities than they are for other 
employees?  
Data Collection 
Data are from a private sector organisation with a very large workforce. The dataset represents multiple years of employee data from the 
previous decade. The sample is limited to the UK workforce of this company. The total number of observations is 393,710. Our need to preserve 
the anonymity of the organisation limits the details we can give, including its sector. Its occupational profile is varied and includes managerial, 
technical, professional, skilled and non-skilled employees. 
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The advantage of using single-company data in uncovering pay growth inequalities is that we are able to limit the influence of sectoral, industrial 
and some occupational effects that influence rates of pay growth. In addition, by using internal pay data at the individual employee level and 
linking it to their personal employment history, we are able to use statistical techniques that control for the influence on pay growth of other 
factors such as age, length of service, the different career paths of part and full time workers, promotions to new grades, vertical segregation to a 
limited extent, and geographical region (Henley and Thomas, 2001). In doing so, we effectively isolate the characteristics under scrutiny, i.e. the 
merit-pay element and the three identities of disadvantage: gender, ethnicity and disability. The large sample size means we are able to test for 
the outcomes of multiple-group membership. 
Methods  
Data for this study was obtained from the organisation’s management information system via a third-party outsourced HR agency with express 
permission from senior managers of the case study organisation. The employee data in the information system is gathered at entry to the 
organisation and followed up in annual monitoring exercises. 
Variables that are utilised in this study are: 
 Ethnicity 
 Disability status 
 Sex 





 Geographic location 
 Grade 
 Part time/full time status 
 Pay 
 Year of data collection 
 Internal inflationary rate. 
These variables require further explanation. Further information on variables and relationships between variables can be found in Table 1.  
Insert Table 1 here 
In the original dataset, ethnicity was represented by five categories: White, Black, Asian (including Indian), Asian Oriental (including Chinese) 
and ‘other ethnicity’. Category membership is self-nominated according to ‘country/region of origin’.1 Because of the need to populate our 
multi-tiered disadvantage model with numbers that are viable in testing our research questions, categories were collapsed into ‘white’ and ‘ethnic 
minority’. Missing and ‘other ethnicity’ responses to this question were excluded.2  
Disabled status was also self-determined. Guidance at the point of data collection suggested that employees should assess their status using the 
definition in the Disability Discrimination Act (1995).  
                                                          
1 Categories of BME membership are taken from the organisation and do not conform to CRE current or contemporaneous recommended terminology. 
2 In limiting our categories to two ethnic variants we recognise the loss of valuable ethnicity data.  
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Data representing sex, length of service, promotion, and age are largely self-explanatory. For the purposes of analysis, scale data for length of 
service was categorised into five-year bands. Age was expressed as a continuous variable with the addition of a squared term to capture typical 
age–wage curvature. Promotion was measured using an integer indicating how many times an employee had been promoted. Part-time pay rates 
are expressed as an equivalent full-time salary. Geographic region was categorised into seven areas including Scotland, Northern Ireland and 
Wales. London is classified separately. It could be argued that the dataset is limited by the unavailability of data on education, experience and 
performance, which are important determinants of pay, and, in particular, the merit-based element of pay. However, as job grades are 
(reportedly) determined by human capital factors on appointment, it is likely that education and experience are largely captured within ‘grade’. 
We deal with the merit element below. 
Given the need to maintain the confidentiality of the organisation at the heart of this study, detail on pay and grade structure is limited. Grade is 
represented in the organisation by eleven hierarchical bands. The organisation overhauled its existing grade structure before data was collected 
for this study, replacing a complicated arrangement of job roles and long pay bands with a system of job families linked to shorter bands. The 
stated intention was to achieve consistency in reward whilst helping to improve flexibility by better reflecting differences in market rates and 
changes in the external environment and also recognising and rewarding individual contribution. This approach is in line with contemporary 
reward management theory and practice (CIPD, 2011; Phillips, 2008; Campbell et al., 1998), with the latter aspect reflecting the belief that those 
who contribute most to an undertaking should be the ones who reap the greatest rewards. In line with this strategy, the organisation operates a 
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system of pay progression that combines annual incremental rises with merit awards. Individuals receive each year both an incremental award 
(unless they are at the top of a scale) and a merit award that comprises up to 20% of their salary.  
Our analysis uses salary data from multiple consecutive years. For reasons of anonymity we avoid identifying exact organisation size, and have 
therefore obscured the number of years of data measurement. We can say that wage growth is determined over the ‘medium term’. To remove 
the influence of new appointees replacing leavers at higher rates, thereby inflating the average pay of each group, only those who were employed 
throughout the period of measurement are included in the dataset. The dataset includes multiple years of pay data, so it is adjusted across years to 
account for general increases in pay (company wage inflation). This is done by adjusting actual (nominal) pay figures using an index of annual 
pay growth across the company as a whole. 
Methods of Analysis 
As previously explained, and following on from our work on multiple disadvantages and pay rates (Woodhams et al, 2013), our objective in this 
paper is to explore the wage growth of groups with multiple disadvantaged identities. We wish to determine whether the wage growth of the 
privileged group differs from groups of employees with one, two or even three layers of disadvantage. To determine this, we have four analytical 
components to our data analysis.  
The analytical steps are: 
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1. To address our first research question, we calculate average pay for year0 – representing our start year – and year0+n representing our final 
year of measurement. We calculate pay gaps relative to privileged groups and increases/decreases to the pay gap over the period of study. 
We undertake Scheffe’s multiple comparison tests to identify whether pay rates of groups of people with disadvantages are significantly 
different (or not) from their privileged comparators and Tukey’s HSD test to determine the size of the difference. 
2. Next, to address our second research question about the impact of merit-pay on pay growth, we control for variables that influence 
aspects of the reward package. We estimate an OLS (log) pay regression model with robust standard errors and pay as the dependent 
variable. The regression holds age, length of service, promotion, job grade, part-time/full-time work, inflationary rate and region constant 
with a disadvantage#year interaction term. This term identifies wage growth coefficients (expressed in percentage terms from the base 
year) for each year by disadvantage group (for single-axis groups and combinations of gender, disability and ethnicity). As these tests 
control for the influence of pay awards arising from inflation, promotion, length of service, relocation and the net effect of staff turnover 
(i.e. cohort effects as poorly paid workers leave and better qualified, better paid ones join), the vast majority of pay progression that we 
report using regression tests, i.e. ‘adjusted’ data, will be derived from merit awards.  
3.  From this pay regression we use a post-estimation pairwise comparison (t) of wage growth coefficients over time to test the significance 
of the differences in wage growth between each disadvantaged group and their privileged counterpart. 
4. Finally, to integrate wage gap and wage growth data we substitute the final year pay rate into our spreadsheet and estimate wage growth 
in cash terms for each year and group going forward until pay is either equalised or diminished to a proportion of the wage of the 
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privileged group. This we call the rate of ‘catch-up’. We extrapolate catch-up rates for both the raw, unadjusted pay growth data achieved 
within step 1 and the adjusted pay growth data within step 2 to determine the effectiveness of each in achieving equity.  
All tests are undertaken for single-axis, paired and triple-axis levels of disadvantage. Data analysis is undertaken within the analytical 
programme STATA. 
Findings 
We open our findings section with two tables that address the first research question. Tables 2 and 3 give establishing mean pay data on groups 
defined by single-axis identity characteristics and sub-groups, i.e. double and triple-axis identity groups. We analyse differences between groups 
and calculate pay gaps and pay growth, i.e. reductions/increases in pay gaps. 
Insert Table 2 here 
Data in Table 2 are interesting, but contain few surprises. Year0 pay figures in Table 2 show that the privileged groups are combinations of the 
male, white group and non-disabled identity groups. Combinations of identity including being female, disabled or from an ethnic minority are 
associated with lower pay. There is also a clear inverse relationship between layers of disadvantaged identities and average pay. Pay rates fall 
and pay gaps widen as layers of disadvantage are added. Comparisons of pay differences are significant between groups. The trend is almost 
completely linear. The exceptions in Table 2 are two categories of ethnic minority disabled workers where the pay level is higher and the pay 
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gap smaller than might be expected. These sub-samples comprise only 0.10% and 0.02% of the total sample, therefore findings are less robust 
and open to the influence of a small number of highly paid outliers.  
Insert Table 3 about here 
Figures from our final year (Table 3) of measurement are similar; Year0+n figures in Table 3 show the rank ordering of salaries within groups is 
maintained. All differences in pay between individuals and their privileged counterparts in year0 and year0+n are statistically significant with the 
exception of the same small group: ethnic minority disabled women (0.04% of the sample). Both years of measurement show gender differences 
as the most significant.  
Pay gaps for disabled workers and sub-groups of disabled workers are largest. Within the double-axis identity groups, disabled women have a 
particularly substantial pay gap (23.08% in Year0 and 21.06% in Year0+n). Amongst the male groups, disability has a significant impact also. 
Ethnic minority men without disabilities have the lowest pay gap of the triple-identity disadvantaged groups (6%, but adding disability to it 
increases it considerably to 10.46%). The pay gap is also considerable for women, at 12.84% less than the male wage in the first year of 
measurement, falling to 9.31% in the final year.  
This observation on the decreasing pay gap brings us to our main focus in this paper: analysis of pay growth. We note in the two right hand 
columns of Table 3 (the difference between pay rates in year0 and year0+n) that pay gaps are reducing and pay is converging. For women, when 
defined as a single-axis group, the gap is decreasing fairly rapidly, being 23.34% less over the duration we measured. The final column shows 
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that pay equity (catch-up) with the privileged group can be achieved in just over 17 years if growth is maintained at this rate. Nevertheless, 
inspection of double- and triple-axis groups of women demonstrates that this gain operates in an uneven fashion; largely to the benefit of groups 
of non-disabled women. The pay gap for disabled women decreases at a much slower rate (8.78%) and equality will take 45 years 6 months to 
achieve. Once ethnicity is added to the profile of this group, the pay gap widens. Overall, there is little pattern to unadjusted pay growth during 
our measurement period, with the exception that disability within all groups is linked to slower growth. 
For our purposes, these sets of findings are useful. They indicate an inverse correlation between average pay (see also Woodhams et al, 2013), 
pay gaps and layers of disadvantaged identity and they indicate that disability may impede pay growth. However, it is also the case that 
unequally experienced pay growth may be a function of other variables. For example, it is likely that promotions (i.e. movement between grades) 
will be unevenly experienced, perhaps favouring the already privileged; that employees in London (which will include a higher promotion of 
ethnic minorities) will receive higher cost-of-living pay awards than those in regions with lower living costs; that part-time workers will receive 
fewer opportunities to boost their pay; and that that long service may negatively influence pay growth because of its association with disability. 
The influence of these and other variables will be incorporated into variations of average base pay (e.g. annual increments, promotion to new 
grade, location allowances) and will confound the data in Tables 1 and 2.  
In contrast, the merit-based contribution to pay growth should, if it is operating according to good practice, be more evenly distributed. 
Therefore, to isolate the impact of merit-pay on the pay growth of each individual (or combination of) disadvantaged identity on pay growth, 
controlling for other variables, we undertook sets of log regression analyses. These sets of analyses address Research Question Two. 
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Findings are presented in Tables 4–6. Within each pay comparison, the base group is that with the highest pay rate in the zero year of 
measurement, and is denoted in italics. We include a column that indicates layers in comparison with the privileged group. We also include a 
column on the right hand side that indicates years to catch up, using only the merit element of pay. 
Insert Table 4 about here 
The first point to note regarding Table 4 is that the explanatory power of each regression equation is very high, accounting for about 99% of the 
variance in pay growth for all groups. This gives us a great deal of confidence in the robustness of our dataset, i.e. that we have captured and 
controlled almost all factors that determine wage growth and, in doing so, have isolated the impact of the merit-based element. The second point 
to note is that once we have introduced controls, the merit element of pay reduces in real terms during the measurement period.  
Table 4 shows us that women have a significantly different merit-based pay growth rate than men and that there is not much difference in growth 
rates between disabled and non-disabled workers nor ethnic minority compared with white workers (although still statistically significant). 
Women demonstrate the most favourable pay growth statistic; their merit-based pay (in real terms) only decreased by 4.93%, whereas for men 
the figure is 5.17%. This equates to a narrowing of the pay gap attributable to the merit-based element by nearly 5% over the period, a small, but 
significant, correction to pay inequity. However, because the portion of pay that is determined by merit-pay within overall pay is a maximum of 
20% of salary, and less in many cases, the catch-up rate until pay equality is reached is low. If women were to rely on merit-based pay alone to 
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ameliorate the pay gap, equity would take 203 years and 2 months to achieve. For disabled workers and ethnic minorities, the catch up rate is 
even lower. 
To continue our investigation of issues raised within Research Question 2, the question now is: how will merit-based pay growth rates respond 
when more layers of disadvantaged-identity are introduced to the single-axis profiles? Is there an association between layers of disadvantaged 
identity and merit-based wage growth? Table 5 gives the growth rates of groups defined by double-axis identities. 
Insert Table 5 about here 
This first point to note here is that once groups are subdivided into double-axis identity groups, rates of growth develop a pattern. Contrasting 
with the analysis of raw growth rates above, under adjusted conditions we can discern an association between more favourable rates of merit-
based pay growth (i.e. smaller decreases) and those with more layers of disadvantaged identity. The difference in rate of change in pay growth 
between groups is not large; however, the pattern is consistent. As layers of disadvantage mount, the pay growth (i.e. rate of loss) becomes more 
favourable and the proportional reduction in the merit-based pay gap increases. We note that the trend is not completely uniform; the growth in 
pay of disabled ethnic minority workers is slower than the privileged comparator and catch-up is therefore an irrelevant concept. It is likely that a 
‘normalising’ effect of a very few highly paid women is causing wage growth in this group to be depressed. 
Also again apparent is a robust correction-effect for all groups of women. Ethnic minority women have the strongest merit-based growth of all. 
Disabled women, in particular, experience a merit-based growth rate that is stronger than would be predicted from their comparatively slowly 
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decreasing unadjusted pay gap, as shown in Table 2 (only 8.78% of a large pay gap was ameliorated during the period). In explanation, it is 
likely that because disability is associated with age and wages are depressed in cohorts of older women (Metcalf, 2009), adjusting for the effects 
of age has allowed a more accurate portrayal of the growth potential of disabled women’s pay to emerge. 
Finally, and to see if the trends identified above hold, we calculated pay growth for groups identified by triple-axis difference. 
Insert Table 6 about here 
The set of regression tests that examine groups defined by triple-axis combinations of identity demonstrates that trends established in previous 
tables are broadly maintained. Again, there is an interactive effect. More favourable merit-based pay growth rates are experienced by those who 
have more layers of difference and these differences accrue exponentially, as opposed to additively. The time it will take to catch up/achieve pay 
equity – if working from a merit basis alone – is lengthy; however, the more ‘disadvantaged’ identities the group has, the more this time period 
reduces. The effect, once again, is most noticeable for groups of women. However, as is anticipated by now, the ethnic minority disabled female 
group demonstrates no growth in comparison with the privileged male group. This outcome seems to fly in the face of general trends; however, 
because of the unusually high mean salary of this group, it appears that the correctional potential of merit-pay is having a normalising effect on 
the pay of this group, only this time in the opposing direction to the general trend. 
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Finally, two points of note: as male groups are distilled into constituent sub-groups, merit-based pay growth strengthens. When compared with 
the growth in pay of women, both white and ethnic minority disabled men have weak pay growth, although it is still stronger than ‘privileged’ 
men. 
Summary of Findings 
The purpose of this paper is to examine wage growth of people with labour market disadvantage(s) in relation to gender, ethnicity and disability. 
Our first aim was to establish whether this growth was stronger relative to privileged groups, leading to a narrowing of pay gaps, and, if so, 
whether groups with more than one advantage were closing these gaps more quickly or more slowly. Our second aim was to establish the impact 
of merit-pay on the relative wage growth of groups with one or more labour market disadvantage. Our conclusions are as follows. Firstly, pay 
progression in this organisation is working to the benefit of groups of multiple-disadvantaged identities, serving to close the pay gaps between 
them and their privileged counterparts. There is no clear pattern to suggest that rate of closure differs in relation to the number of disadvantages 
that someone carries. However, when the impact of merit-pay is isolated, we found the following: 1. Merit-pay alone has a very small impact on 
wage growth. 2. The effect of merit-pay is generally positive, but very marginal – if merit-pay were the only contributory factor in narrowing 
pay gaps in this organisation, they would take many centuries to be eradicated. 3. Merit-pay has a more favourable impact on women’s pay 
growth than it does on people from ethnic minorities or those with disabilities. 4. The pay growth of women with other disadvantages (in relation 
to ethnicity or disability) is stronger than the pay growth for men in those groups. 5. There is a general pattern that the more identities of 
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disadvantage that someone has, the greater effect that merit-pay has in reducing the pay deficits they experience. This effect is interactive, not 
additive. 
Discussion 
The first conclusion – that the pay of disadvantaged groups is rising faster – is interesting. Pay progression can be attributed to a combination of 
annual incremental awards, cost of living rises and merit awards – and in interpreting this finding we need to consider the possible impact of 
each. Cost of living pay rises will have a neutral effect on all groups (in percentage terms: in cash terms, gaps will widen). There is also a good 
case to suggest that incremental pay awards will have a neutral effect on relative pay progression, as all employees in the organisation – 
regardless of identity – move up their pay scale each year. This issue, however, may be more complex. Employees at the top of their pay scale do 
not receive incremental pay increases, and the dynamics of unequal pay would suggest that a higher proportion of these employees would be 
from privileged groups. This may arise from, for example, a greater likelihood for a white man to be initially appointed to a higher grade – or 
grade point – than would be the case for a woman or an employee from a minority group. If this is the case, there will be a ‘topping off’ effect 
whereby the pay of people in disadvantaged groups progresses more quickly by virtue of their moving up incremental scales, while their more 
privileged colleagues can no longer do so. Our data do not allow us to identify or rule out such an effect, but in any case, it is likely to be a 
relatively limited contributory factor in an organisation with short incremental pay bands, such as this one. A more likely cause would be an 
improvement in equality/diversity practice in the organisation, and while we have some information to indicate that this has happened, our data 
do allow us to support this suggestion directly. If this were the explanation for declining wage gaps, it would beg the question as to why the pay 
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gaps for people with disabilities are closing more slowly than the general trend. Empirical research suggests that the disability related wage gap 
is caused by discrimination and ‘unobserved’ differences in productivity; wage differences are suggested to be linked to characteristics 
associated with lower productivity (Malo and Pagan, 2012), differences in human capital and job related characteristics, and attitudinal barriers 
(Schur et al., 2009). In the context of this range of inhibitors, it is possible that these barriers to progression of people with disabilities are 
particularly entrenched and take longer for organisational equality policies to ameliorate. 
We now consider our conclusions on the impact of merit-pay. There is an extensive literature to suggest that merit-pay would be an unlikely 
contributor to the narrowing of pay gaps in relation to equality strands (Castilla and Benard, 2010; Elvira and Graham, 2002); indeed, the 
expectation would be that merit-pay systems will reinforce and exacerbate inequalities of these sorts. However, our findings here suggest that 
merit-pay is actually contributing positively to differential wage growth and thus to the narrowing of pay gaps – albeit very slowly. While such a 
conclusion runs counter to the critical literature on the impact of merit-pay it should not lead us to dismiss that literature or draw a generalised 
conclusion that merit-pay is a positive force in reducing payment inequalities. Organisation-specific factors are likely to be at play. For example, 
this organisation underwent an Equal Pay Audit during the research period, and, notwithstanding theoretical weaknesses explored above, it may 
be that this resulted in particularly careful attention being given to the design, implementation and operation of the merit-pay scheme. Our need 
to preserve the anonymity of the organisation means that we cannot explore these avenues further. It does appear, however, that in this 
organisation the impact of the merit-pay system appears to be more equality-friendly than the historical impact of recruitment and promotion 
decisions (i.e. those that contribute to existing pay gaps). This finding is consistent with a view that, for all their documented weaknesses in this 
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regard (Elvira and Graham, 2002; Salimäki and Jämsén, 2009), merit-pay judgments may be less vulnerable to bias than appointment decisions, 
where managers have less reliable information on capability work performance, which can counteract the influence of any prejudices and 
stereotypes that they may have (Cohen, 1976).  
It is worth reflecting further on the finding that minority and disadvantaged groups are not only reaching the threshold of ‘fair treatment’ under 
this organisation’s system of pay progression, they are actually slightly better rewarded than those who are traditionally privileged, and are 
slowly closing the wage gaps that are known (generally) to be caused by discrimination, occupational segregation and (possibly) choice. Reverse 
or positive discrimination is culturally unacceptable and unlawful in the UK, so this is highly unlikely to be a deliberately caused effect. 
However the notion that minority groups might unintentionally be privileged in pay progression goes so strongly against the grain of the 
literature on prejudice, bias and the effects of the social construction of merit (Kumra, 2010; Thornton, 2007) that this also seems unlikely.  
One response would be to reintroduce an objectivist view of merit and accept that this complements the evidence that minority groups are 
benefiting from its application – indeed, Farber and Sherry (1995) have warned of the implications of not doing so. However this leads to 
another, possibly uncomfortable, suggestion that people from disadvantaged and minority groups have more ‘merit’ in this organisation. We can 
think of one way in which the findings can be explained without having to concede the idea that ‘merit’ is unevenly distributed (by group 
membership) in the population. If minorities were disadvantaged at or before entry to the organisation, those who were appointed would have to 
be particularly able and determined to overcome this. These capabilities would, in a fair merit scheme, be recognised – leading to higher average 
merit awards for minorities. Further, those members of minority groups who were successful in getting appointed to the organisation may have 
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done so at a level below their capabilities – for example, they may be over-qualified (Elliot and Lindley, 2008). Following the reasoning above, 
one would expect merit-pay awards to act as a correction to this.  
Such an explanation cannot be verified (or discounted) in this research due to limitations in the variables in our dataset3. It would, however, be 
entirely consistent with another of our findings – that those with more labour market disadvantages are benefiting more from merit-based pay 
progression. As we have shown elsewhere with cross-sectional data (Woodhams et al, 2013), multiple disadvantage has a strong negative 
association with pay outcomes, so the fact that here this is associated positively with faster pay progression begs an explanation. The notion that 
merit-pay is acting as a corrective to the effects of discrimination or segregation effects at appointment could offer an explanation.  
We also concluded that the benefits accruing from the corrective effect of merit-based pay progression are uneven. We observed that merit-pay 
contributed more to the closing of gender pay gaps than it did to others, particularly those relating to disability. Other studies have indicated that 
people with disabilities have lower access to formal and informal training, and less occupational experience (Schur et al., 2009; O’Hara, 2004). 
In other contexts, factors such as these have been linked to lower merit awards (O’Hara, 2004), and would be a plausible explanation for the 
reduced rate of merit-pay ‘catch-up’ observed here.  
                                                          
3 Data on educational qualifications and experience would be useful here. Data on social class and levels of productivity/performance would also supplement our data. 
However, since the dataset (in terms of explaining variance in pay) is nearly complete (99% in most cases), including these variables would not add much explanatory 
potential to the analysis. 
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We also observed that disadvantaged men (i.e. ethnic minority or disabled) are benefiting less through merit-pay progression than women with 
these disadvantages. In terms of average pay (as opposed to pay progression), Woodhams et al (2014) have shown that men are disadvantaged to 
a greater degree by carrying additional disadvantaged identities than are women. The findings in the current study run in parallel. To the extent 
to which there is a corrective effect arising primarily from merit-pay, men with other disadvantages are less able to take advantage of it. An 
explanation for this may lie in the notion of hegemonic masculinity (Carrigan et al., 1985; Collinson and Hearn, 1996). Particular versions of 
masculinity are privileged – in contemporary western societies, being white and being non-disabled would be among those privileged identities. 
Varying from that ideal has a more detrimental effect for men than for women varying from already less-privileged ‘feminine’ identities. In an 
employment context, men have more to lose from compromises to their masculinity (Author, 2000). This may also help to account for the fact 
that white disabled men are closing the pay gap slowest of all groups. Hegemonic masculinity also often carries with it notions of idealised 
‘manliness’, physicality and technical proficiency (Fuller, 1996), so disabilities arising from some impairments may be constructed in popular 
discourse as departing from this ‘ideal’. The literature on the social construction of merit (Kumra, 2010) would suggest that, for the purposes of 
performance pay systems, merit may be constructed around this ideal form of masculinity. This may have a particularly strong impact in 
organisations that are traditionally dominated by men and masculine values, and/or notions of ‘technical’ expertise, as are most of the large UK-
based organisations of which the case organisation is one.  
To conclude, it is worth reflecting on the extent to which our findings run counter to expectations, not least our own. In the context of a well-
established, and, in our view, generally persuasive literature to the contrary, it is surprising to find such clear evidence that merit-pay has 
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beneficial effects – albeit small ones – on payment equality. In making these claims we are aware that our study is not perfect in design or 
execution. We acknowledge that we are limited by our inability to give operational details of the merit-based pay scheme and the exact size of 
the organisation. We are constrained by our methodology in that we have an imperfect dataset, particularly in relation to entry capital. We 
recognise also that data limitations mean that we have reduced complex identities to three categories of disadvantage. We also acknowledge that 
the ontological and epistemological assumptions we make about the value of the categorical approach to studying detriment experienced at 
intersections may not persuade all commentators (see also McCall, 2005), and this acknowledgement has important implications for our 
suggestions for future research (see below). Finally, whilst we recognise that our findings are consistent with a view that there may be some 
merit in ‘merit’ (Farber and Sherry, 1995), and indeed in merit-pay (from an equality perspective), for the reasons given we would not wish to 
see the study interpreted as a wholesale rejection of the critical merit/merit-pay literature.  
In spite of these limitations, this research study is successful in demonstrating, through a controlled research design, connections between labour 
market disadvantage and pay growth. These suggest a general closing of pay gaps, for single and multiple disadvantage groups, and indicate that 
merit-pay has a very slightly better-than-neutral effect on the pay of minorities; one that is stronger for women, and for those with more 
disadvantages. We now consider the implications of these findings for public policy, HR policy and practice and future research. 
Policy, Practice and Research Agendas 
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This research study has uncovered reducing pay gaps for disadvantaged groups and a connection with multiple disadvantaged identities. Overall, 
an analysis of trends in this organisation demonstrates the corrective potential of good equal pay practice. Possible contributors to this are the 
Equal Pay Audit, a system of merit-based pay that is operated ostensibly fairly, and short pay bands. Nevertheless, for many individuals with 
single and multiple categories of disadvantage, the scenario is negative and will remain so for many years. In view of this, we call for an 
enhanced and robust public policy framework for the diagnosis and redress of discrimination on the basis of dual and multiple disadvantage to 
accelerate converging pay trajectories in both the UK and US (see also Woodhams et al, 2013). Additionally, our findings suggest that 
organisations should undertake equal pay diagnostics that disaggregate the workforce into dual and triple axis groups of disadvantage and this 
advice should be delivered through best practice channels such as the Equality and Human Rights Commission in the UK. Furthermore, HR 
departments should ensure that managers are well trained in awareness of ways that decision making can be biased in relation to multiple 
identities as well as single ones – and our research suggests that they should pay particular attention to this in relation to disabled workers. 
Finally we offer several suggestions for future research. First, on the basis of our findings we suggest that researchers should revisit the impact 
of merit-based pay to replicate and elaborate on our findings in other organisations and in different contexts. Second, in order to investigate the 
narrowing of pay gaps more widely, there is a need for empirical investigation into the connection between multiple disadvantaged identities and 
pay with the capacity to disaggregate influential factors including promotion and the salaries of new appointees. Finally, as the lively debate into 
‘intersectionality’ attests (Bowleg, 2008; Crenshaw, 1991; Denis, 2008; Hofman, 2010; Purdie-Vaughns & Eibach, 2008, Yuval-Davis, 2007), 
attempts to capture the experience of multiple disadvantage through quantitative analysis are open to criticism. We do not wish to rehearse that 
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debate here, but we accept many of the espoused limitations of such approaches and have argued elsewhere (Woodhams and Lupton, 2014) for 
methodological pluralism in this field. Following McCall (2005), we see our inter- categorical approach as providing a foundation for qualitative 
research which will explore in context the nuances and complexities underlying the broader patterns that we have uncovered, and the detailed 
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Table 1: Organisation and sample descriptives, t-tests and chi-square statistical tests  
  Gender Ethnicity Disability 
 n Male Female White Ethnic minority Without disabilities With disabilities 
Gender (%)        
Male 307,069 78.1      
Female 86,331  22.0     
 
Ethnicity (%) 
       
White 369,800 94.3 92.9 94.0  97.5 2.5 
Ethnic minority 23,601 5.7 7.1  6.0 98.1 1.9 
  (1, 393,401) = 222.6***    (1, 393,401) = 31.8*** 
 
Disability (%) 
       
With disabilities 9,760 2.4 2.6    2.4 
Without Disabilities 393,100 97.6 97.4   97.6  
  (1, 402,860) = 13.5***     
 
Mode (%) 
       
Full-time 384,925 99.8 80.7 95.4 97.2 95.5 95.8 
Part-time 17,935 0.3 19.3 4.6 2.8 4.5 4.2 
   (1, 402,860) = 5.9e+04***  (1, 393,401) = 160.6***  (1, 402,860) =1.5 ns 
 













  t (402,858) = -2.1e+02***   t  (393,399) = -67.9***    t  (402,858) =  -9.6*** 
 













  t (402,858) = -1.1e+02*** t  (393,399) = -40.3*** t  (402,858) =  -33.2*** 
 
Geographic region 
       
Region 1 105,582 28.1 26.4 27.7 29.6 27.7 28.0 
Region 2 75,761 18.7 23.9 21.0 4.8 19.8 24.4 
Region 3 92,113 24.9 21.6 24.7 16.7 24.2 22.9 
Region 4 12,290 2.9 4.2 3.5 0.4 3.2 4.7 
Region 5 30,374 7.5 9.5 8.6 0.3 8.0 6.4 
Region 6 10,742 2.7 3.2 3.1 0.1 2.8 2.1 
London 54,411 15.2 11.1 11.6 48.2 14.3 11.6 
   (6, 381,273) =2.7e+03*** (6, 372,447) = 2.7e+04***  (6, 381,273) =266.7*** 

n




Table 2: Average Pay Rates: Year0 






















































Double Axis                                                                                                                                    
Overall  = 743.79*** 
White Men 
Ethnic minority men 
White women 















































































Overall = 804.18*** 
Non-disabled white  
 







































Overall = 375.72 
White non-disabled men 
 
Ethnic minority non-disabled men 
 
White non-disabled women 
 
White disabled men 
 
Ethnic minority disabled men 
 
Ethnic minority non-disabled women 
 
White disabled women 
 






































































*= p<0.05, **= p<.001, ***= p<0.0001  
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Table 3: Average Pay Rates: Year0+n  




(£): Year0 + n 






in pay rate 
(F). 
Reduction in 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































*= p<0.05, **= p<.001, ***= p<0.0001  
Table 4: Regression analysis: Merit-based Pay Growth Rates Single-axis groups  




Growth: Year0 – 
Year0+ n (%) 
Proportional reduction in 
pay gap Year0 -Year0+n 
Test of differences in wage 
growth between groups  (t) 
Pay Equity 































































Plus Controls yes 
R-squared 0.998 
*= p<0.05, **= p<.001, ***= p<0.0001  
Table 5: Regression analysis: Merit-based Pay Growth Rates: Double-axis groups 





Year0 – Year0+ 
n (%) 
Proportional 
reduction in pay 
gap Year0 -Year0+n 
(%) 
Test of differences 
in wage growth 
with privileged 
group (t) 
Pay Equity (years 
to catch up) 
White Men 
Ethnic minority men 
White women 



































Plus Controls Yes  












































Plus Controls Yes  
R-squared 0.993  
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Non-disabled ethnic minority 
 






































Plus Controls Yes  
R-squared 0.989  
*= p<0.05, **= p<.001, ***= p<0.0001  
Table 6: Regression Analysis: Merit-based Pay Growth Rates: Triple-axis groups 




– Year0+ n (%) 
Proportional 
reduction in pay 
gap Year0 -Year0+n 
(%) 
Test of differences 
in wage growth 
with privileged 
group (t) 
Pay Equity (years 
to catch up) 
White non-disabled men 
 
Ethnic minority non-disabled men 
 
White disabled men 
 
White non-disabled women 
 
Ethnic minority disabled men 
 
White disabled women 
 
Ethnic minority non-disabled 
women 
 


















































































Plus Controls Yes  
R-squared 0.993  
*= p<0.05, **= p<.001, ***= p<0.0001  
 
 
